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Scope
Discuss the concepts of:
• Human involvement in technological programs
• How a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts 
for the human in the loop for potential missions 
• Using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis 
(HRA) to asses human risk for a PRA
• Tradeoffs between having a human in the loop or not  
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Introduction
• PRA identifies potential risk contributors 
• HRA is part of the PRA capturing human 
interactions and predicts impact on overall 
mission risk
• Not all human errors have serious consequences
• Human actions can increase or decrease the 
overall risk; removing the human from the loop 
doesn’t always lower the risk
3
Removing the Human from 
the Equation May Result In
• Unnecessary Loss of Mission (LOM) because the 
automated system is too rigid  
• No crew to intervene for  potential vehicle separation 
issues 
• No changes to software when needed (humans are 
involved with developing software codes, and 
uploading code to the spacecraft) 
• Loss of flexibility and capability for the overall system 
since humans can backup multiple systems and 
perform multiple functions 
• Automated systems cannot address potential 
situations that have not been identified but could 
escalate into failure events
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Automated Flight Controls 
with Humans as Backup
Inherent risks using humans in the 
loop
Inherent risks of not using humans in the 
loop
Cause a failure  (errors of omission / commission) Lose flexible backup
Not react in time (slips/lapses, mistakes, and 
circumventions)
Lose limited maintenance capability for minor repairs
Misinterpret or misunderstand  (information 
processing errors such as detection and situation 
assessment)
Lose oversight and minor problems dealt with as they 
arise
Right action, wrong time (skill-, rule-, knowledge-
based errors or information processing)
Failure is failure, software doesn’t adapt unless in the 
programming
Bad decisions cause failures (skill-, rule-,
knowledge-based errors, information processing)
Does not react to any visual or physical “cues” not in 
the programing
Bad decisions contribute to failure (skill-, rule-, 
knowledge-based errors, information processing)
Does not address unexpected consequences of 
programed actions
Loss of communication with software means loss of 
update capability
Cannot distinguish between “bad” data and “good”
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Human Direction 
versus Automation
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Human More Effective/Efficient Automated System More 
Effective/Efficient
When nothing goes as planned or expected Everything goes as planned or expected
No set routine, needs flexible response Set routine with limited deviation
Deal with unexpected consequences Capabilities all identified
Need flexibility in actions for response Consistent, repetitive actions and activities
Additional capabilities needed beyond 
original expectations
Immediate response to event needed (too 
fast for human actions)
Repair small problems to avoid them 
becoming large problems
Barring software or system failures, always 
performs as programmed
By adapting to the situation, people often 
provide the flexibility to “make it work”
Complex or complicated actions needing 
quick response 
Human can be used to mitigate failures Performs for long durations
When considering outside information and 
context in decision making, “it depends on…”
When there are no “maybes” in the decision 
process
Threat detection using multiple subtle cues Quick response actions for set-points /limits
NOTES:
•Automated systems can only follow their programming
•Programming is done by humans based on what they expect to happen
•Changes to programming (updates) are developed and input by humans
Human Interactions Can Be 
Good or Bad
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The Good:
While HRA assumes that humans fail a percentage of the 
time, sensitivity studies show what would occur if a crew was 
not available to make the attempt.
• Orion ~33 % of overall risk was reduced when the crew could 
perform manual aborts 
• Shuttle crew and mission control active response to failures showed 
a risk reduction of ~91%. 
The Bad:
• The human body undergoes physical changes that affect their 
capabilities to react appropriately
• Situations can overwhelm humans regardless even with the best 
planning and training
• Humans can take direct action to save the vehicle, those actions 
taken at the wrong time or under the wrong conditions can also 
result in loss of the vehicle
Summary
• On a really bad day when nothing is going as 
expected, an automated system gives up, but a 
human will keep trying and may succeed.
• Spaceflight is a risk, with or without human error.
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